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Abstract- In first person shooter (FPS) games the round trip 
time (RTT)  (delay, or ‘lag’) between a client and server is an 
important criterion for players when deciding which server to 
join. Estimating the actual importance of this criterion can be 
challenging. Most game servers do not accurately log the RTT of 
either connected clients or potential clients (ones who only 
probed the server). Traffic traces also provide only IP addresses 
of hosts communicating with the game server. In this paper we 
propose a simple, active method of estimating the RTT between 
server and client when armed only with each client’s IP address. 
For rough approximations this scheme works days or weeks after 
client IP addresses were collected. As jitter tends to be influenced 
by router hops we also discuss how to estimate the probable hop 
count between server and client. We illustrate our approach 
using data gathered from a Wolfenstein Enemy Territory server 
operating in Melbourne, Australia. This example shows our 
approach enabling after-the-fact comparisons between the RTT 
and hop-count distributions of clients who probe a server versus 
clients who actually join a server and play. 
Keywords- Game Traffic, Round Trip Time, Hop Count, Post-
game estimation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
First Person Shooter (FPS) games are currently a 
very popular form of multiplayer networked game. 
Game clients probe game servers for information such as 
the current map, the number of current players on the 
server and the current network round trip time (RTT) 
between client and server. Potential players use this 
information to find suitable games and servers to join. 




) between a client 
and server is of particular interest, as it strongly 
influences enjoyment in such fast-paced interactive 
games [1][2][3][4][5][6]. For this reason server 
operators and Internet service providers (ISPs) can find 
it useful to track and characterize the RTT tolerance of 
clients who frequent their servers. To do this they need a 
way to measure the typical RTT experienced by clients 
who probe and join, and those who probe and never join. 
Collecting this information can be difficult. Any 
given FPS server may or may not have the ability to log 
RTT estimates for clients who join and play. Regardless, 
they are usually incapable of logging RTT estimates for 
clients who simply probe the server [7]. At best you 
might modify the server to log the IP addresses of 
probing clients. Even armed with an external packet 
sniffer program such as tcpdump you will be limited to 
collecting IP addresses rather than RTT estimates. 
In this paper we propose an active method of 
estimating the RTT between a server and its clients 
when armed only with each client

s IP address. For 
rough approximations this scheme works days or weeks 
after client IP addresses were collected. As jitter tends to 
be influenced by router hops we also discuss how to 
estimate the probable hop count towards each client IP 
address. Our proposal copes with clients going offline 
after they have played, IP addresses being reassigned to 
entirely different customers after being seen and logged 
by the game server, and network-layer filtering of ICMP 
traffic at (or near) the client end. 
We demonstrate the use of this technique to estimate 
the distribution of RTT and hop count for game clients 
previously seen contacting a Wolfenstein Enemy 
Territory server based in Melbourne, Australia [8]. The 
derived results provide insights into the geographic and 
topological distributions of clients who chose to play and 
those who chose not to play on this particular server. As 
a side benefit, investigation of RTT versus hop count 







 to hosts across the rest of 
the Internet.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 
II describes the proposed measurement methodology. 
Section III demonstrates the use of this methodology on 
client IP addresses gathered from a specific game server. 
Section IV concludes the paper. 
II.  RTT AND HOP-COUNT ESTIMATION 
METHODOLOGY  
Our scheme relies on actively testing, from the 
server

s current location on the network, a subset of IP 
addresses known to represent clients who played or 
probed a particular game server. In this section we 
describe the key assumptions, the sampling technique, 
and the combination of two active probe techniques 
(ping and traceroute) used to estimate past RTT and hop 
count distributions. 
A.Assumptions 
A key assumption underlies this technique: any given 
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IP address is presumed to be roughly the same distance 
away today (measured by RTT and hop count) as it was 
when first logged. We observe that most game clients 
connect via consumer ISPs whose end-user IP address 
ranges are unlikely to move around much topologically. 
Clearly the validity of this assumption degrades over 
time. However, it should be acceptable over weeks or 
months (in the absence of an ISP losing an entire IP 
address block to another ISP in a different country or 
region of the Internet). 
B.Sampling the Client IP Address Set 
An active game server is likely to see thousands if 
not millions of separate IP addresses over periods of 
months. To simplify the subsequent active probing 
process we select a subset of logged client IP addresses 
to represent the characteristics of the path between our 
server and all clients. 
Our simplifying assumption is that clients whose IP 
addresses fall under a common CIDR prefix will share 
much the same path back from the server towards each 
client. For example, in consumer ISP contexts the hop 
count measured to one IP address in a /24 is likely to be
the same as the hop count to any other IP address in that 
same /24. Furthermore, we suggest that RTT measured 
to one IP address in a /24 is likely to be representative of 
the RTT to any other IP address in that same /24. (It is 
true that consumer ISPs may use last-hop access links 
with quite different latency characteristics    uch as dial-
up, cable modem or ADSL. Nevertheless, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that IP addresses within a single 
CIDR prefix are served using a single access 
technology.) 
In section III we illustrate this approach as follows: 
where multiple clients IP addresses share a common /24 
prefix we randomly select only one of those client IP 
addresses to measure for RTT and hop count. (Longer or 
shorter prefix lengths may be utilized if it is known that 
IP addresses in certain ranges are allocated along 
particular prefix boundaries.) 
C.Clients need not remain reachable 
It is unlikely that a game client seen in our server 
logs will still be active on the Internet days, weeks or 
months after the fact. At the time we launch our RTT 
measurement the IP address may have been reassigned 
to someone entirely different or the client may be turned 
off. 
We do not actually require the original client to be 
present at the logged IP address. It is sufficient that some 
entity responds to ICMP Echo Requests directed towards 
each selected IP address. 
In practice it is possible for our ICMP Echo Requests 
to elicit no response from selected IP addresses. The 
target may simply be turned off or IP-layer filtering may 
be active along the path towards the target. In this case, 
we utilize traceroute to probe the path out towards the 
selected IP address and derive RTT and hop-count 
estimates. 
In principle ICMP may be blocked anywhere along 
the path towards the targeted client IP address, skewing 
traceroute

s results. However, by comparing the results 
from client addresses that responded to ping and those 
that needed traceroute we can estimate an adjustment to 
the traceroute-derived RTT and hop-count results. 
D.Measuring RTT and Hop Count 
Figure 1 shows the basic probe sequence for one IP 
address selected from the set of client IP addresses to be 
tested. If ping fails to establish an RTT estimate (for 
whatever reason), we approximate the RTT estimate by 
measuring the RTT (again using ping) to the last IP hop 
seen using traceroute. If traceroute

s last reported IP hop 
cannot itself be pinged we use the RTT estimate 
provided by traceroute itself. 
Start: Read IP 
Check IP is 
pingable? 
traceroute to IP & 
find last traceable 
IP 



















Figure 1: Algorithm for Estimating RTT to Previously Identified IP Addresses 
Each selected IP address is pinged ten times at two-
second intervals. The smallest of the ten ping results is 
chosen as the RTT estimate most likely to be unaffected 
by transient congestion along the path. The standard 
d viation is also calculated to provide some indication of 
how stable the path was during all ten RTT estimates. 
Spacing the pings every two seconds minimizes the 
chances of our efforts being misinterpreted as a denial of 
service attack on the target ISP. 
Ping can fail for a number of reasons - the destination 
host no longer exists or is not switched on, the ICMP 
echo requests are blocked by the end user

s home 
firewall or the ICMP echo requests are being blocked by 
ISP firewall policy somewhere along the path. If ping 
fails we follow up with traceroute. The last hop 
successfully reported by traceroute is pinged and the 
RTT recorded. If ping does not work, we record the RTT 
estimated by traceroute itself. 
Hop count is estimated from the TTL field of ICMP 
messages being returned in response to ping or 
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traceroute. Since the TTL is decremented once per hop 
back towards our location, we can estimate the number 
of hops traversed, by subtracting the final TTL from the 
initial TTL. (Note that if traceroute is used from a 
Windows system the outbound and returned packets are 
both ICMP. When traceroute is used from a unix-like 
system the outbound packets will be UDP and the 
returned packets ICMP.) 
Game clients are most likely found running on 
Windows hosts (and to a much lesser extent, Linux 
hosts). Such hosts typically utilize an initial TTL of 32, 
64, 128 or 255 [9]. We believe most consumer routers 
are likely to respond to traceroutes from a similar 
possible set of initial TTLs. Since it is generally believed 
that few Internet hosts are more than 32 hops away from 
each other [9] we assume the initial TTL value of a 
packet as the smallest of 32, 64, 128 or 255 that is larger 
than the final TTL in each received ICMP packet. 
Traceroute should be configured to probe no more 
than 32 hops away. This substantially reduces the time 
taken to estimate the last hop of an IP address that 
cannot be pinged directly (since traceroute must reach its 
maximum TTL before the identity of the last 
successfully reported hop can be confirmed). 
Ultimately every selected client IP address ends up 
being associated with an RTT and hop-count value in 
one of four categories:  
(A) pinged the client IP address directly  
(B) pinged the last hop reported by traceroute 
(C) used traceroute’s RTT estimate to the last hop 
reported by traceroute  
(D) RTT and hop-count estimated based on the last hop 
reported by traceroute (B and C collapsed into a 
single category) 
E.Adjusting the Last Hop Reported by Traceroute 
Two simple sanity checks should be applied to the 
last-hop returned by traceroute. If the reported last-hop 
comes from private address space (e.g. 192.168/16 [10]) 
or has a different country code than the target client IP 
address (as reported by a database such as GeoLite 
Country [11]) we do exclude this data point from further 
analysis. 
Results from category D are then adjusted to estimate 
the RTT and hop-count to the client IP addresses that 
could not be pinged directly. First we plot the 
distribution of RTT and hop-count values returned in 
categories A and D on separate cumulative distribution 
curves. Over thousands of tested IP addresses in each 
category the distribution curves should look similar, but 
offset from each other. The median difference between 
the curves of both categories indicates the offset to be 
applied to RTT and hop-count results in category D. 
F.Limitations and Considerations 
Most of the assumptions listed earlier rely on 
observed operational traditions within consumer ISPs. 
Such traditions are not necessarily mandated by IETF 
standards or specifications, and may not be universally 
true over time. (For example, not using a common /24 
prefix to cover multiple clients connected through 
different access technologies having diverse RTT 
characteristics.) 
Another limitation is that our RTT measurements are 
not taken under the same network conditions that existed 
while each client was accessing the server. For example, 
ICMP packets do not have the same length distributions 
as game packets, leading to slightly different 
serialization delays along the path. It is also well known 
that routers do not handle ICMP packets quite the same 
way as regular UDP or TCP packets, potentially leading 
to slight over-estimation of RTT to the selected client IP 
addresses [13]. However, we suggest over-estimating by 
few milliseconds is tolerable in the context of game 
clients from around the planet exhibiting tens or 
hundreds of milliseconds RTT. 
In addition, we assume peering agreements along the 
path to each client are essentially unchanged. In 
principle such agreements may change at any time, 
altering the internal topology of the Internet between 
ccess ISPs. Thus the RTT and hop-count distributions 
measured today may differ significantly from those 
experienced by individual clients when they actually 
played on your server. 
 
 
Figure 2: Hops Along Different Paths May Contribute Quite Different 
Latencies 
It is also worth keeping in mind the variable 
relationship between RTT and hop-count (noted in 
previous related work, e.g. [14]). Along a given route 
RTT usually increases with increasing hop count. 
However, different routes may exhibit quite different 
relationships between RTT and hop count. Physically 
short hops will contribute far less propagation delay than 
physically long hops. The next hop towards one IP 
address may jump a few metres inside an ISP, yet the 
next hop to another IP address may involve thousands of 
kilometres between continents. For example, Figure 2 
illustrates the diversity of paths and RTTs seen at 1, 2, 3 
and 4 hops away from the server analysed in section III. 
Along the far left hand branch hop 3 is 2.65ms away. If 
we continued along the left branch hop 4 is 4.52ms 





Hop3 Hop3 Hop3 
Hop4 Hop4 Hop4 Hop4 Hop4 
.46ms 
.76ms 
2.56ms 7.85ms .92 ms 
10.54ms 4.52ms 212.25ms 
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III.  ILLUSTRATION USING A GAME SERVER 
BASED IN AUSTRALIA  
In this section we illustrate the use of our RTT and 
hop-count estimation technique. Client IP addresses, 
gathered from an Australian-based Wolfenstein Enemy 
Territory (ET) server [12] are used to build plausible and 
useful insights into the distribution of players and non-
players who visited the server. 
A.Background 
In 2005 we published an analysis of server-probe 
traffic impacting two ET servers based in Australia [8]. 
That research differentiated between clients who actually 
played on each server, and clients that were only ever 
seen probing each ET server (for updated game-state, 
RTT and map information). We showed that a modestly 
utilised FPS server is inundated with many hundreds of 
thousands of probe queries per week, regardless of how 
many people actually play on the server. Data was 
gathered over 20 weeks between November 2004 and 
March 2005 from servers based in the cities of 
Melbourne and Canberra. Probe and game-play traffic 
was analysed for its daily and weekly fluctuations by 
volume and approximate geographic origin (using 
Maxmind

s GeoLite Country [11], which claims to be 
97% accurate). Over the 20 week period probe traffic 
contributed roughly 16 million flows, 36 million packets 
and 8 gigabytes of data transfer in and out both the 
Melbourne and Canberra servers. By contrast, game-play 
accounted for roughly eight thousand flows, 755 million 
packets and 116 gigabytes of traffic in and out of the 
Melbourne server. (The Canberra server was less 
popular and saw far less game-play traffic.) 
As a side effect we ended up with roughly 2.4 million 
distinct client IP addresses from the Melbourne server 
for which we had no RTT or hop-count information. 
Neither server had been modified to log its internal RTT 
estimates for clients who actually played, nor could they 
meaningfully estimate RTTs for clients who simply 
probed (without joining). Unfortunately, due to disk 
space limitations we had not kept tcpdump files that 
would have provided TTL information from which to 
estimate hop-counts. 
Table 1: Subnet Reduction of IP Addresses 
 Initial No. Of IP 
addresses 
Reduced No. Of IP 
addresses 
Game Flows 5,469 4,252 
Probe Flows 2,397,879 325,707 
 
Hoping to gain some insights into the differences 
between clients who played and probed, we decided to 
compare the RTT and hop-count distributions of each 
class of clients. We reduced the 2.4 million client IP 
addresses by selecting one IP address at random from 
groups sharing common /24 prefixes. Table 1 shows the 
significant benefit of this reduction    from 2.4 million 
we ended up with roughly 330,000 IP addresses to 
actively test. (The most significant reduction involved IP 
addresses who were seen to probe rather than play our 
server.) 
B.Performing the Active Measurements 
Active scans were performed from a FreeBSD 5.4 
host (a 2.8GHz Intel Celeron with 1 GB of RAM) on the 
ame IPv4 subnet as the Melbourne ET server used in 
[8]. To speed up measurements we ran fifty parallel 
instances of the algorithm explained in section II.D. 
Each instance tested a non-overlapping set of client IP 




 set in Table 1, and was 
launched at a random time relative to each other (to 
minimize correlated bursts of outbound ping or 
traceroute traffic). With fifty instances running the CPU 
load fluctuated between 3% and 5%, suggesting CPU 
load would have minimal impact on RTT estimates 
reported by ping or traceroute. Averaged over all IP 
addresses in category A and category D (section II.D) 
the ping/traceroute sequence took 1.45 minutes per 
address. (Adjusting the FreeBSD 5.4 kernel

s default tick 
rate from 100Hz to 1000Hz was also necessary to 
provide 1ms resolution to ping RTT estimates. Versions 
since FreeBSD 5.4 now ship with a default tick rate of 
1000Hz [16].) 
C.Summary of Raw Results 
Our raw results were post-processed to remove 
anomalous data points before creating the statistics 




 refers to the class of 





 refers to the class of clients 
who established short-lived probe-only traffic flows to 
the server. 
Table 2: Game Flow and Probe Flow Results 
 Game Flows Probe Flows 
Number of IP 
Addresses 
4252 325,707 
Ping directly 28% 26% 
Ping last hop from 
traceroute 
63% 62% 




In brief, approximately: 
• 2% of traceroute-derived data points were 
removed because the last hop IP address was not 
in the same country as the target client IP address. 
• 0.004% of traceroute-based data points were 
eliminated because they returned a private IP 
address [10] as the last hop. 
• 2.6% of game flow IP addresses and 1.4% probe 
flow IP addresses were removed because the RTT 
was calculated to be over 1000ms, or the standard 
deviation over ten RTT samples was over 100ms. 
D.Accuracy of RTT Estimations 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of both dataset

s 
standard deviation. More than 90% of the RTT estimates 
have a standard deviation under 10ms, suggesting the 
estimation process was fairly consistent over the 10 
pings. 
Probe flows show a slightly higher standard deviation 
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 (at higher RTT and higher 
hop count) than game flow clients. Higher hop count 
means more router hops    and thus congestion points - at 
which jitter may potentially be introduced. 
 

















Figure 3: Probe and Game Flow    Standard Deviation of RTT Estimates 
(CDF) 
 
E.Validity of Using Traceroute to Determine the Last Hop 
One of our implicit assumptions is that traceroute can 
be used to identify an IP address topologically close to 
the target IP address when the target IP address itself 




 would mean we 
find the last hop before the target IP address. Our results 
suggest this assumption is reasonably valid. 
From Table 2 we see that IP addresses associated 
with 28% of game flows and 26% of probe flows 









, where we are 
approximating the desired data point by measuring RTT 
and hop count to the last hop successfully identified by 
traceroute. 
Cumulative distribution function (CDF) plots for 
both pingable and non-pingable data points reveal that 
non-pingable clients seem to be one or two hops and 10-
30ms closer than pingable clients. This suggests our 
traceroute technique is, in fact, generally identifying an 
IP device one or two hops from the target IP address. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the CDFs of measured 
hop counts for game flow and probe flow IP addresses 
respectively. If the non-pingable curve is moved right by 
one hop (game flows) or two hops (probe flows) the 
distributions for pingable and non-pingable flows are 
approximately identical. This is consistent with the non-
pingable data points being derived from an IP entity one 
or two hops closer than pingable data points. 
A similar, although slightly weaker, observation can 
be made based on RTT estimates. Figure 6 and Figure 7 
show the CDFs of estimated RTT for game flow and 
probe flow IP addresses respectively. In this case we 
found the distributions for pingable and non-pingable 
flows are roughly the same if the non-pingable curve is 
shifted right by 20ms. 
Consequently, for the rest of our analysis we adjusted 
all non-pingable data points up by 20ms and one or two 
hops (for game and probe flows respectively). 


















Figure 4: Game Flows    Pingable & Non Pingable Hop Count CDF 


















Figure 5: Probe Flows    Pingable & Non Pingable Hop Count CDF 
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Figure 6: Game Flows    Pingable & Non Pingable Round Trip Time CDF 
(These offsets are plausibly due to the common use 
of consumer-grade last-hop access technology such as 
dial-up, ADSL or cable modem. The actual game clients 




 would have 
probably been 10ms to 30ms further away than the ISP 
router interface we were ultimately able to ping. We 
appear to be on relatively safe ground in treating the 
adjusted traceroute-derived data points as equivalent to 
pingable data points.) 
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Figure 7: Probe Flows    Pingable & Non Pingable Round Trip Time CDF 
 
F.Geographical Distribution of Game Clients 
Using the GeoLite Country database [11] we 
identified IP addresses from 54 countries amongst game 
flows and 138 countries amongst probe flows. As 
previously reported in [8], a vast majority of game flows 
were attributable to only a small number of countries. 
Australian players accounted for 57% of the game flows, 
the next highest being Poland with approximately 8% of 
game flows, followed by USA and Germany with 4-5% 
each. By contrast, probe flow demographics were quite 
different European countries contributed to 52% of 
probe flows, with the USA contributing another 30% of 
probe flows. 
Using the technique in section II allowed us to extend 
the results from [8] to reveal the topological 
consequences of being from different countries. Figure 8 
shows the distribution of hop counts for both game flow 
and probe flow clients from a number of countries. 
Australian clients are 5 to 15 hops away while 
international clients are at least 10 hops away. (As 
implied by Figure 2, 10 to 15 hops to international 
clients are likely via quite different and physically longer 
paths compared to the Australian clients who are also 
between 10 and 15 hops away.) 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of RTTs for clients 
from a number of countries, along with the average RTT 
from each of the countries. Australia has an average 
RTT of 56ms (with almost all clients being below 
100ms) while clients from other countries have RTTs of 
at least 180-200ms. 
 






















Figure 8: Hop Count per Country (CDF) 








Country & Mean RTT
Australia            56ms
Belgium           314ms
England           342ms
France             338ms
Germany          316ms
Netherlands      336ms
Poland             375ms








Figure 9: Round Trip Times per Country (CDF and mean) 
G.RTT and Hop Count Analysis 
Comparing the RTT distributions of game and probe 
flows (as shown in Figure 10) makes clear the 
correlation between RTT and people

s decision to play 
or not play. Around 50% of game flows have RTT less 
than 100ms, and 60% of game flows have an RTT of less 
than 200ms. By contrast, the majority (over 90%) of 
probe flows (people who subsequently chose not to play 
on our server) originate from clients with RTT over 
200ms. This provides indirect support for previously 
published work that puts FPS player tolerance for RTT 
between the high-100s and low-200s of milliseconds 
[1][2][3][4][5]. 
A similar comparison is provided by Figure 11, 
which compares the hop count distributions for game 
flow and probe flow clients. Less than 10% of probe 
flows appeared with hop count under 13, whereas 60% 
of game play flows occurred with hop count under 13. 
Figure 11 also provides a clear indication that no 
game-playing clients were closer than 5 hops, and 
confirms the existence of two distinct communities of 
players    those between 5 and 15 hops away, and those 
between 17 and 25 hops away. On the other hand, the 
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community of probe-only clients is clustered strongly 
between 10 and 25 hops away from our server. Based on 
Figure 8 the majority of these probe-only clients 
(particularly over 15 hops away) reside outside 
Australia. 
0 200 400 600 800
















Figure 10: Probe & Game Flows    Round Trip Time CDF 

















Figure 11: Probe and Game Flows    Hop Count CDF 
Relationships between apparent geographic origin, 
RTT and hop count are shown in Figure 12 (for game 
flows) and Figure 13 (for probe flows). Both figures 
show graphs of average RTT versus hop count for flows 
originating in five different countries. 
Both graphs clearly reveal that RTT experienced by 
players outside Australia is dominated by the paths taken 
just to get to and from Australia itself. We can see that
most Australian clients are between 5 and 15 hops away, 
and less than 100ms. Most American clients are between 
10 and 26 hops away, and between 180 and 300ms. 
Clients from France, Germany and Poland tend to be 16 
to 25 hops and 320 to 400ms away. 
For destinations outside Australia there is one or 
more long-haul international links before traffic 
distributes itself around within their home country. In-
country RTT versus hop count has a fairly modest 
gradient in both graphs. This reflects the fact that while 
IP paths in-country cover small geographic areas they 
may have many hops through closely located ISP 
equipment racks or Internet exchange points. (A dip in 
the mean RTT versus hop count at a couple of places is a 
consequence of aggregating the RTTs from clients 
reached through diverse in-country paths, similar to what 
we noted in Figure 2.) 























Figure 12: Game Flow   Mean Round Trip Time vs. Hops per Country 

























Figure 13: Probe Flow   Mean Round Trip Time vs. Hops per Country 
IV.CONCLUSIONS 
Although game servers can be instrumented to log 
RTT estimates of clients who actually play on a server, it 
is difficult to log the RTT experienced (or perceived) by 
clients who simply probe a server without playing. This 
paper describes a simple technique involving ping and 
traceroute to establish RTT and hop-count estimates, 
after the fact, between a game server and game clients 
who may no longer be attached to the Internet. 
We assume that RTT and hop-count estimates must 
be derived at some point in time long after the client IP 
addresses were logged at a game server. We further 
assume that, by virtue of being seen playing (or probing) 
a game server, each client IP address is most likely 
associated with a consumer Internet connection. This 
enables a key simplification    the RTT and hop-count to 
every client IP address under a common CIDR prefix 
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will be approximately the same. So, for example, 
multiple client IP addresses from the same /24 can be 
measured by estimating the RTT and hop-count to just 
one of them chosen at random. This step can reduce 
millions of IP addresses down to thousands for 
subsequent active probing. 
Since clients may come and go, and ping

s ICMP 
echo request/reply packets are often blocked by personal 
firewalls near the target host, it may be necessary to use 
traceroute to identify an IP router close to a target cli nt 
IP address. We show how the distance (in RTT and 
hops) between a traceroute-derived last hop and the 
actual target client IP address may be indirectly inferred 
when large numbers of client IP addresses are available. 
Our approach is demonstrated using client IP address 
data collected from a Wolfenstein Enemy Territory (ET) 
server based in Melbourne, Australia. Roughly 2.4 
million client IP addresses were reduced to a sample set 
of 330,000 IP addresses, representing clients who played 
or probed the ET server. We found that 26-28% of client 
IP addresses could still be pinged directly, we could ping 
the traceroute-derived last hop router in 62-63% of 
cases, and in 9-12% of cases we had to use traceroute

s 
own estimate of RTT to the last hop it could find. We 
also found evidence that traceroute generally reached 
within one hop of clients who had been logged playing 
on the server, and within two hops of clients who had 
simply probed the server. 
The obtained RTT and hop-count distributions 
illustrated the topological and geographical 
characteristics of clients that played on our Melbourne-
based ET server, compared to those who simply probed 
the server. RTT and hop-count distributions broken 
down by approximate country of origin also provided an 
indirect illustration of Australia

s challenging 
topological position for ET game players in the Northern 
Hemisphere. (Australian players fell between 5 and 15 
hops from our server, while international players were 
well over 15 hops away. Of the clients that played, 60% 
had an RTT less than 200ms. In comparison, only 10% 
of people who simply probed our server had an RTT less 
than 200ms. 
Our approach has some distinct limitations. 
Primarily, one cannot simply assume the Internet

s 
topology is static. RTT and hop-count measurements 
taken today do not necessarily reflect, in absolute terms, 
the RTT and hop-count prevailing at the time each client 
connected to the game server. Peering arrangements may 
change, and ISPs may move IP address space between 
their dial-up, cable modem and ADSL access offerings. 
After-the-fact estimation of RTT and hop counts should 
be performed as soon as possible after the client IP 
addresses are collected. 
Nevertheless, this paper

s technique is a reasonable 
approach if one primarily wishes to establish a broadly 
indicative set of RTT and hop-count distributions based 
solely on client IP addresses found in (game) server logs. 
It can provide further insights into the RTT tolerance of 
players by revealing the RTT distributions of clients who 
probed, but did not play, on a monitored game server. 
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